

**STATEMENT BY  
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PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE INTERNATIONAL  
ORGANIZATIONS IN VIENNA  
TO THE CONFERENCE ON FACILITATING  
THE ENTRY-INTO-FORCE  
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY**

**SEPTEMBER 17-18, 2007  
VIENNA, AUSTRIA**

Mr. Chairman,

On behalf of the Government of Canada, I wish to extend my thanks to you and to all of the ratifiers and signatories of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty present here today for demonstrating a continued commitment to this vitally important Treaty. I also wish to take this opportunity to congratulate Palau and the Dominican Republic for their recent ratifications, which brings the number of States that have fully committed to banning, for all time, the testing of nuclear weapons to 140. Since the last Article XIV Conference in September 2005, 15 states have ratified the Treaty, including all of the remaining states in Europe. This achieved the notable milestone of having the Treaty ratified by an entire continent. Furthermore, the ratification of the Treaty by Vietnam reduced the outstanding ratifications by Annex 2 states to 10.

The ratification of the Treaty by the remaining Annex 2 states is all the more important in the aftermath of the nuclear test explosion conducted by the DPRK on 9 October 2006. This test, which the Government of Canada deplored, broke a moratorium on nuclear test explosions that stood since 1998. This action reinforces Canada's belief that the threat to global security caused by nuclear tests is not a relic of the Cold War. The threat exists today and, until the CTBT achieves entry into force, the threat will persist. A universalized CTBT represents the foremost international legal instrument to prohibit any further nuclear test explosions anywhere in the world.

If one was to look for a silver lining around the dark cloud that appeared over the DPRK last October, it yielded another successful demonstration of the capabilities of the International Monitoring System and of the CTBTO itself to detect and respond to a suspected nuclear test explosion. Monitoring stations around the world, including the radionuclide station operated in Canada at Yellowknife, successfully detected and transmitted data to the International Data Centre where the CTBTO then produced timely and detailed products for State Signatories in a manner that was transparent and objective. Where once such an event would have only be detected by a handful of states using less precise instrumentation at a much greater distance, the Treaty's verification system, even in its incomplete state, has provided all State Signatories with the opportunity to access highly reliable information from an objective source in order to make an informed national determination of the event.

The success of the International Monitoring System remains one of the strongest assets of the CTBTO in promoting ratification of the Treaty. Not only has the Treaty's verification system repeatedly proven its ability to detect suspicious seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide events all over the world, but the data that is gathered by the system's existing monitoring stations has been successfully used in a multitude of civil scientific applications, with new applications being continuously found. Technological capacity-building was one of the primary interests of many states that participated in the regional CTBT workshop in Mexico City that was co-hosted by Canada and Mexico in October 2006.

In the final reckoning, the most important variable in a state's decision to ratify the CTBT remains political will. For those states that have declared their support for the Treaty, it is necessary that political will be applied to devoting the necessary resources to completing the Treaty's ratification and implementation. There exist numerous sources of assistance for such endeavours from the CTBTO as well as through the assistance programs of many ratifiers. For those states that have expressed concerns regarding the impact of the Treaty on national security, it is necessary that political will be applied to resolving existing nuclear security concerns, whether they are bilateral, regional or international. In these cases, the CTBT should be seen as a helpful tool that can be used to build confidence, transparency and mutual trust in regions where security is undermined by the presence of nuclear weapons or the prospect of nuclear proliferation. The CTBT's legal obligations and its proven ability to verify the nature of suspected nuclear test explosions make the Treaty a vital asset in improving international security and working toward realizing the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Thank you.