

**Statement by H.E. Ambassador Antonio José Vallim Guerreiro,
Permanent Representative of Brazil,
during the Conference to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) - Vienna, September 17th-18th, 2007**

Your Excellencies,
Distinguished Delegates,
Ladies and gentlemen,

At first, allow me to congratulate you, Your Excellency Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria, and His Excellency Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Costa Rica, on your election as Presidents of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. I am confident that with your able leadership, the Conference will reach a fruitful conclusion. You can be assured that the Brazilian Delegation will give its full support and co-operation in facilitating your task as Presidents.

I also extend my gratitude to Ambassador Sérgio Duarte for conveying the ideas and the vision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations as regards the CTBT and the urgent need for its entry into force.

I would also like to congratulate Ambassador Ana Teresa Dengo, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations in Vienna, and Ambassador Thomas Stelzer, Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations in Vienna, Coordinators of the preparatory process for this Conference, for the patient manner in which they have conducted the informal consultations on the draft Final Declaration of the Conference. I also express our gratitude and appreciation to the Secretariat for their diligent work in support of our discussions.

Co-Presidents,

Brazil is deeply concerned with the fact that eleven years after the CTBT was opened for signature the prohibition to conduct nuclear tests is not yet a legal obligation. What is even more distressing is the total lack of perspective for the entry into force. More than that, it is the open opposition in some quarters to the idea that nuclear tests should be forgone once and for all, as well as the insistence that, for the sake of national security, this option should remain open.

Some would like to make us believe that unilateral, voluntary and non-binding assurances and moratoria are sufficient. It is certainly not, in the same way as unilateral, voluntary and non-legally binding assurances by non-nuclear-weapon States about their exclusively peaceful nuclear intentions have never been considered enough by the international community, and rightly so.

The CTBT is the only treaty so far negotiated that would provide for a multilaterally agreed, universal and non-discriminatory verification system directly relevant for nuclear disarmament, inasmuch as it would remove necessary conditions for the sophistication of nuclear arsenals.

Co-Presidents,

As a member of the New Agenda Coalition, Brazil participated actively in the negotiations that led to the unanimous adoption of the practical steps to nuclear disarmament during the VI Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in 2000. The so-called "13 steps" represented a major breakthrough for the Treaty, as they set out clear and objective requirements for the progressive implementation of the unequivocal obligation of nuclear weapon States Parties to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, as provided for in Article VI of the NPT. Each and every one of those steps, which include the need for the entry into force of the CTBT, is vital for the achievement of a sustainable and balanced regime for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

Brazil therefore reaffirms its deep concerns with the fact that some Nuclear Weapon States have been consistently trying to renege and back down on those commitments. Examples of this behavior were amply demonstrated during the final rounds of the negotiation of the final statement of this Conference, much to our disappointment.

We would therefore remind once again that there is simply no valid justification for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. The constant pursuit of such justifications by Nuclear Weapon States and the fact that such States cling on to their nuclear arsenals as if their security depended on the continued possession of nuclear weapons will only contribute to reinforce the root causes of nuclear proliferation.

Co-Presidents,

My delegation would also like to express our satisfaction with the work undertaken by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, which, under the wise and able leadership of its Executive Secretary, Mr. Tibor Tóth, has been working diligently to put in place a verification system that is to become operational when the CTBT enters into force.

Nevertheless, we would like to take this opportunity to offer a word of caution against a possibility that may put all these efforts in serious jeopardy. The continued provisional operation of the IMS without the entry into force of the CTBT would mean that the international community would have devoted enormous amounts of political, technological and financial resources to monitor compliance with an obligation that simply is not there. In addition, it would allow States that have not ratified the Treaty, in particular those among them which are Nuclear-Weapon States, to enjoy nearly all of the

benefits of the system without the need to abide by the legal obligations that provide the very foundation of the CTBT regime.

Some would argue that the indefinite provisional operation of the IMS is an end unto itself, in that the monitoring capabilities of the system would discourage States from engaging in nuclear testing out of fear of being exposed, thus acting as a "deterrent" even in the absence of the entry into force of the Treaty. One has only to look back to October 2006 to realize the limitations of that deterrent.

This situation is unacceptable and unsustainable, and if unchanged it will inexorably erode support to the CTBT and may ultimately lead to its demise.

To conclude, co-presidents, I once again reaffirm the full support of Brazil to the CTBT and our commitment to the first and foremost purpose of the Treaty: the total prohibition of nuclear weapons testing, once and for all. We trust that the draft Final Declaration will once again highlight not only the importance of upholding the CTBT as an essential element in the multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation structure, but also the urgent need for its entry into force.

Thank you.