

**Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

(Vienna, Sept 3-5, 2003)

STATEMENT BY THE BRAZILIAN DELEGATION

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Mr. President,

Let me express our sincere congratulations on your election to preside over this conference. This is a tribute to Finland's unfailing commitment to the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. I would like also to thank Ambassador Tom Grönberg for the leadership provided during the preparatory process for this conference.

Mr. President,

As we engage in yet another exercise to facilitate the entry into force of the Comprehensive Ban Treaty, the record of the past few years leads to a mixed review. On the positive side we welcome the fact that the international community has made important strides towards the universalization of the Treaty, which has already been signed by 168 States and received 104 ratifications.

But the actual prospect for its entry into force is still bleak, since the list of Annex II countries that have not yet signed or ratified remains almost unchanged. This falls really short of the international community's expectations.

We welcome Algeria's recent ratification. At the same time we renew our call to the remaining 12 countries whose signature and ratification is required to urgently take the political decisions necessary to join the international community efforts to ban nuclear weapons testing once and for all from the face of the earth. We must stress in this respect the special responsibility of the two nuclear powers that have not yet ratified, as well of those countries that still remain outside the non-proliferation regime.

Mr. President,

Insufficient signatures and ratifications of the CTBT by Annex II countries is not the only stumbling block in our collective endeavors to free mankind from the dreadful threat of nuclear weapons.

There are many other disturbing developments in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We cannot fail to express our deep concern at the lack of progress in the implementation of the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament, which were agreed by all States parties at the 2000 NTP Review Conference. We are dismayed by the fact that certain countries are now renegeing on those commitments, particularly with respect to the early entry into force of CTBT, the irreversibility of arms reduction measures, and the “unequivocal commitment” to achieve total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

We are disturbed at the signs of complacency with continued nuclear proliferation outside the provisions of the NPT. We are also concerned with the possible consequences of one country’s withdrawal from the NPT, and with the unresolved questions regarding another country’s safeguards obligations.

Particularly disturbing are the new approaches to security strategies that include the development of new types of nuclear weapons, and an attempt to re-rationalize their use. At the same time we continue to be confronted with a complete paralysis in the activities of the Conference of Disarmament.

Mr. President,

My country firmly believes that multilateralism is the only sustainable means to address security concerns common to all.

We are also convinced that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two sides of the same coin. These are mutually reinforcing processes that must go hand in hand. There can be no lasting progress in non-proliferation efforts in the absence of commensurate developments in the field of nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons continue to play a central role in security policies, the risk of proliferation - both vertical and horizontal – will not cease to haunt us.

Mr. President,

Brazil is a State party to all multilateral agreements on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We are also proud to be part of the first nuclear weapon free zone established in an inhabited area of the world. Under the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the entire Latin American and Caribbean region renounced to the development of nuclear weapons and sought assurances that these dreadful devices will not be used against our countries. Brazil has also established as a Constitutional principle that nuclear energy must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

This is part of our genuine contribution to international peace and security.

Mr. President,

Brazil was among the first signatories of the CTBT in 1996 and we completed the process of ratification in 1998. We firmly support the objectives of the Treaty and all initiatives to promote its early entry into force. Given its non-discriminatory nature and universal scope, the provisions of the Treaty represent a sound evolution to the asymmetries prevailing in other non-proliferation instruments.

Pending entry into force of CTBT, all countries - particularly the nuclear weapon States and those that have developed nuclear capabilities outside the NPT regime - must strictly observe a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. This moratorium, however, must not be seen as a substitute for their required signature and ratification of CTBT.

Mr. President,

We are concerned with the fact that the costly completion of the International Monitoring System is advancing at a much faster pace than the prospect for the Treaty to enter into force. The CTBT provides that the verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification requirements at the entry into force. In the same vein, the decision on the establishment of the Preparatory Commission clearly refers to the provisional nature of the IMS and IDC, which - at this stage and until the Treaty enters into force - should operate only as required for maintenance and testing purposes.

As there can be no formal verification regime without legally binding obligations in force under the Treaty, we consider it by all means undesirable that the monitoring system

be brought to full operation before the Treaty enters into force. This situation would not be “in tandem” with the requirements of a truly universal and comprehensive test ban as provided for by the Treaty.

These considerations do not diminish in any way our support for the progressive establishment of the monitoring system. I should recall that six monitoring installations and one radionuclide analysis laboratory are located in Brazil.

Mr. President,

Despite the many lacunae that could not be filled during the process of negotiations, Brazil supports the adoption of the draft Final Declaration prepared for this Conference in the hope that it will in fact contribute to the promotion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to its early entry into force.

We have no illusions, however, that the CTBT could ever enter into force without a genuine change in the political attitude of some Annex II countries towards the objectives and universal principles of the Treaty.

Thank you.