



Statement by Brazil

**at the Thirteenth Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (Article XIV
Conference)**

September 22th, 2023

Thank you.

Brazil congratulates Panama and Norway for their election as co-presidents and thanks Italy and South Africa for their work. We also thank Dr. Floyd for his permanent efforts for universalization of this treaty.

The delegation reiterates Brazil's commitment to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)

and is honored to join this Thirteenth Conference, the first that we hold in person since 2019.

Brazil was one of the first countries to ratify the CTBT back in 1998 and has taken an active role in supporting the entry into force and universalization of the treaty, as part of our broad efforts towards promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

It is with regret that we note that we are no closer to entry into force today than we were when we last met in person four years ago, in 2019. While we welcome the recent ratifications by Timor Leste, Tuvalu, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, São Tome and Principe, the Solomon Islands and Sri Lanka, we are still waiting on accession by eight Annex II states, including two NPT nuclear weapon states. We urge all remaining states to sign and ratify this treaty, which improves the security of nuclear and non-

nuclear states alike. Pending entry into force, we strongly urge all states to abstain from nuclear tests, especially explosive tests.

Yet the loss of momentum in CTBT ratification mirrors a loss of momentum in nuclear disarmament more broadly. We are witnessing an erosion of the nuclear disarmament machinery, illustrated, *inter alia*, by the failure of a second NPT Review Conference, last year, as well as the decade-long deadlock in the nuclear track of the UNDC and the recent inability to reach consensus at the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna just last month.

The machinery must be shored up and momentum must be restored. The entry into force of the CTBT is a good starting point for both of those things.

Consolidating the norm against nuclear testing would send a powerful signal that the world is refocusing its attention on halting the development of new nuclear weapons, as an important step towards reduction and elimination. This should include a halt to sub-critical testing, computer simulations, the development of low- and variable-yield warheads as well as any activity that runs counter to the principles of the CTBT. The accession of the two remaining NPT Nuclear-Weapon States would do much to reinvigorate nuclear disarmament efforts and could be done simultaneously as a confidence-building measure in itself.

The full membership of all NPT Nuclear-Weapon States in the CTBT would, in turn, exert a powerful force for the universalization of the treaty, including with regard to non-NPT States possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation often works in feedback loops: the pursuit of nuclear weapons by a

given State provides a strong incentive for others to reciprocate. Yet so does disarmament. Positive actions, such as permanent halts in weapons testing, reduces risks for all and encourages others to do the same. The CTBT could be a valuable tool for breaking out of the current negative feedback loop of rising nuclear tensions and promoting a positive loop of increased confidence and reductions in arsenals.

We reiterate that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only pathway towards true security for all. Let us begin by taking the first, but crucial step of banning nuclear tests.

I thank you.